Arbeitspapier
Wage rigidity or fiscal redistribution? The unemployment bias of time consistent redistributive policies
Because of Time Inconsistency considerations, policymakers underestimate the drawbacks of wage rigidity as a redistributive tool. Consequently, they redistribute inefficiently income from high to low skilled workers. They typically implement too much wage rigidity whereas other means (in particular fiscal transfers) could achieve the same redistributive goal with less perverse effect on unemployment. Time inconsistency is more likely due to lack of credibility than to the short-term horizon of policymakers. Hence, policymaking processes should be reformed towards more transparent and binding agreements between government and social partners.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2116
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
- Thema
-
unemployment
inequality
wage rigidity
time inconsistency
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lehmann, Etienne
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2006
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lehmann, Etienne
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2006
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