Arbeitspapier
The rigidity bias
We study the basic economic problem of choice between long-term and short-term commitments under a general characterization of uncertainty (aggregate uncertainty).When contingencies are contractible, a perfect market of Arrow-Debreau contingent claims implements the social optimum.When contingencies are not contractible, long-term commitments receive too much weight in individual portfolios.The economy as a whole is too rigid during periods of high aggregate shocks.The model links a rigidity bias with the operation of the price mechanism and the monetary system.
- ISBN
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952-462-100-2
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers ; No. 31/2003
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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liquidity
central banking
monetary system
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Herrala, Risto
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bank of Finland
- (wo)
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Helsinki
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Herrala, Risto
- Bank of Finland
Entstanden
- 2003