Arbeitspapier

The rigidity bias

We study the basic economic problem of choice between long-term and short-term commitments under a general characterization of uncertainty (aggregate uncertainty).When contingencies are contractible, a perfect market of Arrow-Debreau contingent claims implements the social optimum.When contingencies are not contractible, long-term commitments receive too much weight in individual portfolios.The economy as a whole is too rigid during periods of high aggregate shocks.The model links a rigidity bias with the operation of the price mechanism and the monetary system.

ISBN
952-462-100-2
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers ; No. 31/2003

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
liquidity
central banking
monetary system

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Herrala, Risto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Finland
(where)
Helsinki
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Herrala, Risto
  • Bank of Finland

Time of origin

  • 2003

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