Arbeitspapier

Shallow meritocracy

Meritocracies aspire to reward hard work and promise not to judge individuals by the circumstances into which they were born. However, circumstances often shape the choice to work hard. I show that people's merit judgments are "shallow" and insensitive to this effect. They hold others responsible for their choices, even if these choices have been shaped by unequal circumstances. In an experiment, US participants judge how much money workers deserve for the effort they exert. Unequal circumstances disadvantage some workers and discourage them from working hard. Nonetheless, participants reward the effort of disadvantaged and advantaged workers identically, regardless of the circumstances under which choices are made. For some participants, this reflects their fundamental view regarding fair rewards. For others, the neglect results from the uncertain counterfactual. They understand that circumstances shape choices but do not correct for this because the counterfactual-what would have happened under equal circumstances-remains uncertain.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 405

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Subject
Meritocracy
fairness
responsibility
attitudes towards inequality
redistribution
social preferences
inference
uncertainty
counterfactual thinking

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Andre, Peter
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.2139/ssrn.3916303
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Andre, Peter
  • Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE

Time of origin

  • 2023

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