Arbeitspapier
Shallow meritocracy: An experiment on fairness views
Meritocracies aspire to reward effort and hard work but promise not to judge individuals by the circumstances they were born into. The choice to work hard is, however, often shaped by circumstances. This study investigates whether people's merit judgments are sensitive to this endogeneity of choice. In a series of incentivized experiments with a large, representative US sample, study participants judge how much money two workers deserve for the effort they exerted. In the treatment condition, unequal circumstances strongly discourage one of the workers from working hard. Nonetheless, I find that individuals hold the disadvantaged worker fully responsible for his choice. They do so, even though they understand that choices are strongly influenced by circumstances. Additional experiments identify the cause of this neglect. In light of an uncertain counterfactual state - what would have happened on a level playing field - participants base their merit judgments on the only reliable evidence they possess: observed effort levels. I confirm these patterns in a structural model of merit views and a vignette study with real-world scenarios.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 115
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Thema
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Meritocracy
attitudes toward inequality
redistribution
fairness
responsibility
social preferences
inference
uncertain counterfactual
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Andre, Peter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
- (wo)
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Bonn and Cologne
- (wann)
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2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Andre, Peter
- University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
Entstanden
- 2021