Arbeitspapier
Supply chain innovations and partial ownership
We show that competing downstream firms may rather invest in their inefficient inhouse production than help improve the technology of the efficient supplier, even if this is costless. Even worse, a downstream firm can have strong incentives to decrease the efficiency of the supplier in order to improve its outside options. We demonstrate that non-controlling partial backward ownership can align the incentives of the supplier and its customers with respect to supply chain innovations.
- ISBN
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978-3-86304-280-6
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 281
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
- Subject
-
knowledge spillover
innovation
minority shareholdings
supply chain efficiency
vertical partial ownership
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hunold, Matthias
Shekhar, Shiva
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (where)
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Düsseldorf
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hunold, Matthias
- Shekhar, Shiva
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Time of origin
- 2018
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