Arbeitspapier

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3295

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Public Goods
Subject
Lindahl pricing
noncooperative games
private provision of public goods
Stackelberg equilibrium
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Öffentliches Gut
Allokationseffizienz
Duopol
Extensives Spiel
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Meier, Volker
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Meier, Volker
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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