Arbeitspapier
One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing
We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3295
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Public Goods
- Subject
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Lindahl pricing
noncooperative games
private provision of public goods
Stackelberg equilibrium
Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion
Öffentliches Gut
Allokationseffizienz
Duopol
Extensives Spiel
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Meier, Volker
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Meier, Volker
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2010