Arbeitspapier

Sanctioning and Trustworthiness across Ethnic Groups: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan

We show how sanctioning is more effective in increasing cooperation between groups than within groups. We study this using a trust game among ethnically diverse subjects in Afghanistan. In the experiment, we manipulate i) sanctioning and ii) ethnic identity. We find that sanctioning increases trustworthiness in cross-ethnic interactions, but not when applied by a co-ethnic. While we find higher in-group trustworthiness in the absence of sanctioning, the availability and use of the sanction closes this gap. This has important implications for understanding the effect of institutions in developing societies where ethnic identity is salient. Our results suggest that formal institutions for enforcing cooperation are more effective when applied between, rather than within, ethnic groups, due to behavioral differences in how individuals respond to sanctions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7179

Classification
Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Field Experiments
Labor Contracts
Subject
sanctions
cooperation
crowding out
moral incentives
ethnicity
Afghanistan

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bartos, Vojtech
Levely, Ian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bartos, Vojtech
  • Levely, Ian
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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