Arbeitspapier
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation.
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government for allocating more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the effects of changes in the degree of corruption, aid fatigue, and ethnic composition, in the donor country on the allocation of aid.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: EPRU Working Paper Series ; No. 1999-05
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lahiri, Sajal
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
- (wo)
-
Copenhagen
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lahiri, Sajal
- Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
- University of Copenhagen, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
Entstanden
- 1999
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