Arbeitspapier

Competitiveness of entrepreneurs and salaried workers

We measure the willingness to compete of entrepreneurs and salaried workers in an experiment. We let participants choose between a piece-rate and a tournament scheme either in private or in public. We find that in the private condition entrepreneurs are less competitive than salaried workers, but that in the public condition this ordering is reversed. Data from a follow-up survey suggest that social image concerns of entrepreneurs and perceived norms can explain why entrepreneurs are more competitive when decisions are publicly observable. Our survey also reveals that more competitive entrepreneurs earn higher profits in their businesses.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2021/7

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Field Experiments
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Entrepreneurship
Subject
Competitiveness
Entrepreneurs
Salaried Workers
Profits
Field Behavior
Experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Balafoutas, Loukas
Batsaikhan, Mongoljin
Sutter, Matthias
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Balafoutas, Loukas
  • Batsaikhan, Mongoljin
  • Sutter, Matthias
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Time of origin

  • 2021

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