Arbeitspapier

Asymmetric information and roll-over risk

How do banks choose their debt maturity structure when credit markets are subject to information frictions? This paper proposes a model of equilibrium maturity choice with asymmetric information and endogenous roll-over risk. We show that in the presence of public signals about firms' creditworthiness (credit ratings), firms choose to expose themselves to positive roll-over risk in order to minimize price distortions. Short-term financing is socially desirable when banks' capacity to repay short-term creditors depends on their credit rating, as it helps mitigate the underlying adverse selection problem. Notwithstanding these social benefits, the equilibrium maturity structure always exhibits inefficient short-termism. If banks receiving a credit downgrade face sufficiently high roll-over risk, the equilibrium maturity structure approaches the constrained efficient allocation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1364

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Thema
Debt Maturity
Rollover Risk
Asymmetric Information
Global Games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
König, Philipp
Pothier, David
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • König, Philipp
  • Pothier, David
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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