Arbeitspapier
Bidimensional quality competition and scope economies
In markets where product quality is important, more than one characteristic is usually necessary to define product quality and the amelioration of the goods characteristics is usually costly. Then, properties of production technologies, in particular if they exhibit economies or diseconomies of scope in producing quality along several dimensions, should matter for the industry configuration at equilibrium. To date, however, the literature has neglected the issue. We analyze a duopoly model where two characteristics can be used to vertically differentiate the products. Our results are that the existence of economies of scope (resp. diseconomies of scope) leads to the emergence of a quality leader in all dimensions (resp. to a different quality leader in each characteristic).
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 653
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Produktqualität
Produktdifferenzierung
Marktführer
Verbundvorteil
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Garella, Paolo G.
Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4593
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Garella, Paolo G.
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2008
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Does Monopoly Undersupply Product Quality?
Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
Coordinating R&D efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
The Contestability Paradigm in the Presence of Vertical Differentiation: Entering the Incumbent's Quality Niche
Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition
Monopoly, Quality, and Network Externalities
International Trade and Spatial Competition
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition
Endogenous timing in quality choices and price competition
Does Monopoly Undersupply Product Quality?
Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
Coordinating R&D efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
The Contestability Paradigm in the Presence of Vertical Differentiation: Entering the Incumbent's Quality Niche
Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition
Monopoly, Quality, and Network Externalities
International Trade and Spatial Competition
Minimum Quality Standard Under Cournot Competition and Pollution
Endogenous Timing in Quality Investments and Price Competition
Endogenous timing in quality choices and price competition
Does Monopoly Undersupply Product Quality?
Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition
Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition
Coordinating R&D efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
The Contestability Paradigm in the Presence of Vertical Differentiation: Entering the Incumbent's Quality Niche
Choosing Roles under Supply Function Competition