Arbeitspapier

Self-Serving Biases in Bargaining. Explaining Impasse

There is strong evidence that in bargaining situations with asymmetric outside options people exhibit self-serving biases concerning their fairness judgements. Moreover, psychological literature suggests that this can be a driving force of bargaining impasse. This paper extends the notion of inequity aversion to incorporate self-serving biases due to asymmetric outside options and analyses whether this leads to bargaining breakdown. I distinguish between sophisticated and naive agents, that is, those agents who understand their bias and those who do not. I find that breakdown in ultimatum bargaining results from naiveté of the proposers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2006-9

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
fairness perceptions
self-serving bias
inequity aversion
ultimatum bargaining
outside options

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kohnz, Simone
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2006

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.899
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-899-2
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kohnz, Simone
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)