Arbeitspapier
Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further allows us to show that proposers use different equity rules and apply them in a self-serving manner. They tend to follow the rules that suggest the highest payoff for them. Responders exhibit a similar pattern of behavior. Combined, these tendencies lead to high inefficiencies due to frequent rejections.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7625
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Thema
-
Outside Options
Equity Principle
Ultimatum Game
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rilke, Rainer Michael
Walkowitz, Gari
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
- Irlenbusch, Bernd
- Rilke, Rainer Michael
- Walkowitz, Gari
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2013