Arbeitspapier

Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further allows us to show that proposers use different equity rules and apply them in a self-serving manner. They tend to follow the rules that suggest the highest payoff for them. Responders exhibit a similar pattern of behavior. Combined, these tendencies lead to high inefficiencies due to frequent rejections.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7625

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Thema
Outside Options
Equity Principle
Ultimatum Game

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rilke, Rainer Michael
Walkowitz, Gari
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
  • Irlenbusch, Bernd
  • Rilke, Rainer Michael
  • Walkowitz, Gari
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2013

Ähnliche Objekte (12)