Arbeitspapier
Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further allows us to show that proposers use different equity rules and apply them in a self-serving manner. They tend to follow the rules that suggest the highest payoff for them. Responders exhibit a similar pattern of behavior. Combined, these tendencies lead to high inefficiencies due to frequent rejections.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 7625
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Subject
-
Outside Options
Equity Principle
Ultimatum Game
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Rilke, Rainer Michael
Walkowitz, Gari
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
- Irlenbusch, Bernd
- Rilke, Rainer Michael
- Walkowitz, Gari
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2013
Other Objects (12)
Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
Bargaining impasse : the role of asymmetric outside options, self-serving biases and participation requirements
Bargaining, search, and outside options
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bidding with outside options
Self-Serving Biases in Bargaining. Explaining Impasse
Outside Options and Worker Motivation
Outside options and worker motivation
Outside Options and Worker Motivation
Worker Beliefs about Outside Options
Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
Bargaining impasse : the role of asymmetric outside options, self-serving biases and participation requirements
Bargaining, search, and outside options
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bidding with outside options
Self-Serving Biases in Bargaining. Explaining Impasse
Outside Options and Worker Motivation
Outside options and worker motivation
Outside Options and Worker Motivation
Worker Beliefs about Outside Options
Self-Serving Use of Equity Rules in Bargaining with Asymmetric Outside Options
Bargaining impasse : the role of asymmetric outside options, self-serving biases and participation requirements
Bargaining, search, and outside options
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bargaining power and outside options in the interbank lending market
Bidding with outside options
Self-Serving Biases in Bargaining. Explaining Impasse
Outside Options and Worker Motivation
Outside options and worker motivation
Outside Options and Worker Motivation