Legislative bargaining with joint production: An experimental study

Arbeitspapier

We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 670

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
• Subject: multilateral bargaining ; claims ; fairness ; majority rule ; experiments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Merkel, Anna ; Vanberg, Christoph
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (where): Heidelberg
• (when): 2019

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.11588/heidok.00027256
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207646
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-272560
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET