Arbeitspapier
Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: The case of n ≥ 4 firms
The Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and professional forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for n ≥ 4 firms is characterized as the solution of a well-behaved boundary value problem. The analysis suggests that, in contrast to the cases n = 3 and n → ∞ , the equilibrium for a finite number of n ≥ 4 firms tends to overrepresent locations at the periphery of its support interval. Moreover, in the class of examples considered, an increase in the number of firms universally leads to a wider range of location choices and to a more dispersed distribution of individual locations. The results are used to comment on the potential benefit of competition in forecasting markets.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 168
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Subject
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Location
Hotelling game
mixed-strategy equilibrium
boundary value problem
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Ewerhart, Christian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Zurich
- (when)
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2014
- DOI
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doi:10.5167/uzh-97669
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ewerhart, Christian
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2014