Network formation with endogenous decay

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers a model of economic network characterized by an endogenous architecture and frictions in the relations among agents as described in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network model with the difference that frictions in the relations among agents are endogenous. Frictions are modeled as dependent on the result of a coordination game, played by every pair of directly linked agents and characterized by 2 equilibria: one efficient and the other risk dominant. The model has a multiplicity of equilibria and we produce a characterization of those are stochastically stable.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Papers in Economics and Statistics ; No. 2007-14

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Sociology of Economics ; Production and Organizations: General ; Labor and Demographic Economics: General
• Subject: network ; decay ; strategical interaction ; Netzwerk ; Spieltheorie ; Gleichgewicht ; Koordination ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Feri, Francesco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
• (where): Innsbruck
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71936
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET