Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States
Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of stock option introduction as a part of CEO compensation in listed US firms during the 1994–2004 period. The results are consistent with agency costs and recruiting considerations, suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO compensation in order to address the 'investment horizon' problem. The findings also suggest that CEO stock option adoption is not necessarily influenced by the same factors that have been found in the literature to affect the level of CEO stock option compensation and the adoption of broad-based stock option incentives. Overall, the findings provide evidence for several theoretical predictions, thus adding to our understanding of managerial incentives
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 68 (2008) 1 ; 100-111
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Mannheim
- (wann)
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2008
- Urheber
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Tzioumis, Konstantinos
- DOI
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10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.008
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264026
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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15.08.2025, 07:33 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Beteiligte
- Tzioumis, Konstantinos
Entstanden
- 2008