Why do firms adopt CEO stock options? Evidence from the United States

Abstract: This paper examines the determinants of stock option introduction as a part of CEO compensation in listed US firms during the 1994–2004 period. The results are consistent with agency costs and recruiting considerations, suggesting that firms do not adjust CEO compensation in order to address the 'investment horizon' problem. The findings also suggest that CEO stock option adoption is not necessarily influenced by the same factors that have been found in the literature to affect the level of CEO stock option compensation and the adoption of broad-based stock option incentives. Overall, the findings provide evidence for several theoretical predictions, thus adding to our understanding of managerial incentives

Location
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Extent
Online-Ressource
Language
Englisch
Notes
Postprint
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 68 (2008) 1 ; 100-111

Event
Veröffentlichung
(where)
Mannheim
(when)
2008
Creator
Tzioumis, Konstantinos

DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.008
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264026
Rights
Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Last update
15.08.2025, 7:33 AM CEST

Data provider

This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Associated

  • Tzioumis, Konstantinos

Time of origin

  • 2008

Other Objects (12)