Arbeitspapier
Hotelling Tax Competition
This paper shows how competition among governments for mobile firms can bring about excessive differentiation in levels of taxation and public good provision. Hotelling's Principle of Minimum Differentiation is applied in the context of tax competition and shown to be invalid. Instead, when an equilibrium exists, differentiation of public good provision is maximized. Non-existence of equilibrium, which is possible, is a metaphor for intense tax competition. The paper also shows that, to some extent, perfect tax discrimination presents a solution to the existence problem created by Hotelling tax competition, but that the efficiency problem of Hotelling tax competition is exacerbated.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 932
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
hotelling
limit tax
perfect tax discrimination
tax competion
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Wooders, Myrna
Zissimos, Ben
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Wooders, Myrna
- Zissimos, Ben
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2003
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