Arbeitspapier
Voluntary approaches and the organisation of environmental R&D
We consider a setting where firms undertake emission-reducing R&D and the regulator, who sets the emission tax, is unable to commit credibly. Firms are subject to research spillovers in emission reduction. We examine two regimes with respect to the organization of R&D: independent R&D and an environmental R&D cartel (ERC). Environmental R&D is higher in the ERC compared to independent R&D for small damages and also for large damages when R&D is efficient. In contrast, when damages are large and R&D is inefficient the opposite is true. The same ranking applies to the comparison of social welfare.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 74. 2000
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Subject
-
Environmental R&D Cartels
Environmental Research Joint Venture
Cooperative R&D
Emission Tax
Industrielle Forschung
Umwelttechnik
Ökosteuer
Selbstverpflichtung
Forschungskooperation
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 2000