Designing Democratic Constitutions: The Search for Optimality

Abstract: This article analyses salient trade-offs in the design of democracy. It grounds this analysis in a distinction between two basic models of democracy: simple and complex majoritarianism. These models differ not only in their electoral and party systems, but also in the style of coalition-building. Simple majoritarianism concentrates executive power in a single majority party; complex majoritarianism envisions the formation of shifting, issue-specific coalitions among multiple parties whose programs differ across multiple conflict dimensions. The latter pattern of coalition formation is very difficult to create and sustain under pure parliamentary government. A separation of powers between executive and legislature can facilitate such a pattern, while also achieving central goals of simple majoritarianism: identifiable cabinet alternatives before the election and stable cabinets afterward. The separation of powers can thus balance simple and complex majoritarianism in ways that are u

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch
Anmerkungen
Veröffentlichungsversion
begutachtet (peer reviewed)
In: Politics and Governance ; 7 (2019) 4 ; 243-253

Klassifikation
Politik

Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wo)
Mannheim
(wer)
SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.
(wann)
2019
Urheber

DOI
10.17645/pag.v7i4.2239
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022082214104818097980
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
25.03.2025, 13:48 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Beteiligte

  • Ganghof, Steffen
  • SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V.

Entstanden

  • 2019

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