Arbeitspapier

On the Emergence of Overcompliance with Endogenous Environmental Standards and Patronising Consumers

We propose a model of environmental overcompliance in a duopoly setting where consumers are environmentally concerned and may patronise the product they buy, firms set their green investment to abate the impact of productivity on pollution and a government sets the environmental standard with the aim to maximise welfare. We show that, with no patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral by the firm with higher quality standard under Bertrand behaviour, whereas both firms may overcomply under Cournot competition if the environmental impact of production is sufficiently low. Conversely with patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral with low environmental impact of production under price competition, and both firm overcomply under quantity competition.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 847

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Environmental Economics: General

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3915
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lambertini, Luca
  • Tampieri, Alessandro
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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