Arbeitspapier
Endogenous limits on proposal power
We present a dynamic model of legislative bargaining in which policy making proceeds until the proposer has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace the previously approved policy. We characterize stationary Markov perfect equilibria for the game and show that in all pure-strategy equilibria, a majority of voters without proposal power have an incentive to protect each others' benefits to secure their own long-term bargaining positions in the legislature. As a consequence, the value of proposal power is constrained.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1465
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Diermeier, Daniel
Fong, Pohan
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Diermeier, Daniel
- Fong, Pohan
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 2008
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