Arbeitspapier

An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of d’Aspremont et al. (1983). These schemes are “almost ideal” in that they stabilize these coalitions which generate the highest global welfare among the set of “potentially stable coalitions”. Our sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation and which therefore are likely to suffer from severe free-riding.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 155.2004

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Cooperative Games
Subject
Coalition games
Partition function
Externalities
Sharing schemes
Koalition
Spieltheorie
Externer Effekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Eyckmans, Johan
Finus, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Eyckmans, Johan
  • Finus, Michael
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2004

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