Arbeitspapier
An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities
We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of dAspremont et al. (1983). These schemes are almost ideal in that they stabilize these coalitions which generate the highest global welfare among the set of potentially stable coalitions. Our sharing scheme is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation and which therefore are likely to suffer from severe free-riding.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 155.2004
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Cooperative Games
- Thema
-
Coalition games
Partition function
Externalities
Sharing schemes
Koalition
Spieltheorie
Externer Effekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Eyckmans, Johan
Finus, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Eyckmans, Johan
- Finus, Michael
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2004