Artikel
Sharing a river with downstream externalities
We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents' participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-15 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Externalities
Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- Thema
-
downstream externalities
downstream incremental distribution
optimal emission abatement
river pollution
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Steinmann, Sarina
Winkler, Ralph
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
MDPI
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3390/g10020023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Steinmann, Sarina
- Winkler, Ralph
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2019
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