Artikel

Sharing a river with downstream externalities

We consider the problem of efficient emission abatement in a multi polluter setting, where agents are located along a river in which net emissions accumulate and induce negative externalities to downstream riparians. Assuming a cooperative transferable utility game, we seek welfare distributions that satisfy all agents' participation constraints and, in addition, a fairness constraint implying that no coalition of agents should be better off than it were if all non-members of the coalition would not pollute the river at all. We show that the downstream incremental distribution, as introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002), is the only welfare distribution satisfying both constraints. In addition, we show that this result holds true for numerous extensions of our model.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 1-15 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Externalities
Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
Subject
downstream externalities
downstream incremental distribution
optimal emission abatement
river pollution

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Steinmann, Sarina
Winkler, Ralph
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3390/g10020023
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Steinmann, Sarina
  • Winkler, Ralph
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2019

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