- Language
-
Spanisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Serie Documentos de Trabajo ; No. 674
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
-
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
refinement
signals
credible deviations
self-selection condition
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Streb, Jorge M.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
- (where)
-
Buenos Aires
- (when)
-
2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Streb, Jorge M.
- Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA)
Time of origin
- 2018
Other Objects (12)
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play
How to compute perfect foresight equilibria
On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
Uniformly perfect equilibria in a Neo-Keynesian model
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play
How to compute perfect foresight equilibria
On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
Uniformly perfect equilibria in a Neo-Keynesian model
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: epistemic foundations
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing During the Play
How to compute perfect foresight equilibria
On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
Perfect Equilibria in a Trade Liberalization Game
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Discounted Stochastic Games
Subgame-perfect equilibria in stochastic timing games
Uniformly perfect equilibria in a Neo-Keynesian model
Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Continuous-Time Repeated Games