Optimal lender of last resort policy in different financial systems

Arbeitspapier

In a framework closely related to Diamond and Rajan (2001) we characterize different financial systems and analyze the welfare implications of different LOLR-policies in these financial systems. We show that in a bank-dominated financial system it is less likely that a LOLR-policy that follows the Bagehot rules is preferable. In financial systems with rather illiquid assets a discretionary individual liquidity assistance might be welfare improving, while in market-based financial systems, with rather liquid assets in the banks' balance sheets, emergency liquidity assistance provided freely to the market at a penalty rate is likely to be efficient. Thus, a "one size fits all"-approach that does not take the differences of financial systems into account is misguiding.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper Series 1 ; No. 2004,39

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Incomplete Markets ; Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Monetary Policy ; Central Banks and Their Policies
• Thema: Financial Crises ; Lender of Last Resort ; Comparing Financial Systems ; Lender of Last Resort ; Finanzmarkt ; Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fecht, Falko ; Tyrell, Marcel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Deutsche Bundesbank
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/19506
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ