Arbeitspapier

Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848-2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations in making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum was held. We also show that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they listen to parliament rather than interest groups.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2012-11

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Thema
Bounded rationality
voting
referenda attention
rules of thumb

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stadelmann, David
Torgler, Benno
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Stadelmann, David
  • Torgler, Benno
  • Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)