Arbeitspapier
Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period
Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848-2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations in making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum was held. We also show that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they listen to parliament rather than interest groups.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CREMA Working Paper ; No. 2012-11
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
- Thema
-
Bounded rationality
voting
referenda attention
rules of thumb
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Stadelmann, David
Torgler, Benno
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Stadelmann, David
- Torgler, Benno
- Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)
Entstanden
- 2012