Arbeitspapier
Mechanism Design with Narratives
Individuals use narratives as rationales or justifications to make their claims more convincing. I provide a general framework for partial verifiability based on narratives. Narratives give many reasons and arguments. The receiver derives the message’s meaning by aggregating these reasons; her private information tells her whether some potential reasons support the sender’s claims. Therefore, the receiver detects misreports with positive probability. Narratives flexibly allow for different degrees of partial verifiability and allow using the revelation principle. Considering mechanism design as an example, I prove that narratives are so powerful to implement efficient trade in the canonical bilateral-trade setting.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8502
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Subject
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narrative
communication
partial verifiability
mechanism design
bilateral trade
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lang, Matthias
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2020
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lang, Matthias
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2020