Arbeitspapier

Mechanism Design with Narratives

Individuals use narratives as rationales or justifications to make their claims more convincing. I provide a general framework for partial verifiability based on narratives. Narratives give many reasons and arguments. The receiver derives the message’s meaning by aggregating these reasons; her private information tells her whether some potential reasons support the sender’s claims. Therefore, the receiver detects misreports with positive probability. Narratives flexibly allow for different degrees of partial verifiability and allow using the revelation principle. Considering mechanism design as an example, I prove that narratives are so powerful to implement efficient trade in the canonical bilateral-trade setting.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8502

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
narrative
communication
partial verifiability
mechanism design
bilateral trade

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lang, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lang, Matthias
  • Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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