Arbeitspapier
How Do Political Connections of Firms Matter during an Economic Crisis?
We use a new machine learning-enabled, social network based measurement technique to assemble a novel dataset of firms' political connections in India. Leveraging this data along with a long panel of detailed financial transactions of firms, we study how political connections matter during an economic downturn. Using a synthetic difference-in-differences framework, we find that connected firms had 8-10% higher income, sales, and TFPR gains that were persistent for over a three-year period following the crisis. We unpack various mechanisms and show that connected firms were able to delay their short-term payments to suppliers and creditors, delay debt and interest payments, decrease expensive long-term borrowings from banks in favor of short-term non-collateral ones, and increase investments in productive assets such as computers and software. Our method to determine political connections is portable to other applications and contexts.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16131
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- Thema
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political connections
firms
crisis
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Chen, Yutong
Chiplunkar, Gaurav
Sekhri, Sheetal
Sen, Anirban
Seth, Aaditeshwar
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Chen, Yutong
- Chiplunkar, Gaurav
- Sekhri, Sheetal
- Sen, Anirban
- Seth, Aaditeshwar
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2023