Arbeitspapier

Political connections and depositor discipline

We examine the effects of political connections on depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the former politician's party is currently in power - less so if the former politician served as a minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits they bring to the bank during their term tend to leave with them.

ISBN
978-952-6699-05-9
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers ; No. 6/2013

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Depositor discipline
political connections
banks

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Disli, Mustafa
Schoors, Koen
Meir, Jos
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Disli, Mustafa
  • Schoors, Koen
  • Meir, Jos
  • Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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