Arbeitspapier

Limited enforceable international loans, international risk sharing and trade

This paper analyzes the impact of limited enforceable international loans on international risk sharing and trade fluctuations in a two-country two-good endowment economy. Our specification of the punishment threat allows the exclusion from trade to last only finitely many periods and distinguishes between financial autarky and full autarky. Quantitative results show that limited enforceability substantially alters cross-country consumption correlations and the dynamics of net exports. In contrast to existing studies, risk sharing is low for large elasticities of substitution between the domestic and foreign goods. However, it remains challenging to explain the high volatility of the terms of trade empirically observed.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2005,055

Classification
Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Incomplete Markets
International Lending and Debt Problems
Open Economy Macroeconomics

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Scholl, Almuth
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Scholl, Almuth
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk

Time of origin

  • 2005

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