Arbeitspapier
Limited enforceable international loans, international risk sharing and trade
This paper analyzes the impact of limited enforceable international loans on international risk sharing and trade fluctuations in a two-country two-good endowment economy. Our specification of the punishment threat allows the exclusion from trade to last only finitely many periods and distinguishes between financial autarky and full autarky. Quantitative results show that limited enforceability substantially alters cross-country consumption correlations and the dynamics of net exports. In contrast to existing studies, risk sharing is low for large elasticities of substitution between the domestic and foreign goods. However, it remains challenging to explain the high volatility of the terms of trade empirically observed.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2005,055
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Business Fluctuations; Cycles
Incomplete Markets
International Lending and Debt Problems
Open Economy Macroeconomics
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Scholl, Almuth
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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2005
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Scholl, Almuth
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Time of origin
- 2005