Taxing human capital efficiently: the double dividend of taxing non-qualified labour more heavily than qualified labour

Arbeitspapier

Assuming decreasing returns to education and the endogenous supply of qualified and non-qualified labour it is shown to be efficient to supplement a consumption tax with positive incentives for education. If the return from education is isoelastic and if the choice is between (i) subsidizing the monetary cost of education and (ii) taxing non-qualified labour income more heavily than qualified labour income while keeping the effective cost of education constant, the latter policy is shown to be second-best efficient. In particular, any tax distortions should be constrained to labour choices while the choice of education should remain undistorted. The result holds for arbitrary utility functions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 2328

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Bildungsverhalten ; Lohnsteuer ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Qualifikation ; Doppelte Dividende ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Richter, Wolfram F.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33859
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-20090825364
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ