Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

Arbeitspapier

We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 828

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: General ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bigoni, Maria ; Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (where): Bologna
• (when): 2012

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4186
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159667
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET