Arbeitspapier
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
This paper provides evidence that free riders are heavily punished even if punishment is costly and does not provide any material benefits for the punisher. The more free riders negatively deviate from the group standard the more they are punished. As a consequence, the existence of an opportunity for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 183
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Voluntary cooperation
public good
punishment
emotions
social norms
experiments
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Gaechter, Simon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fehr, Ernst
- Gaechter, Simon
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 1999
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