Arbeitspapier

The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation

This paper reports the results of an individual real effort laboratory experiment where subjects are paid for measured performance. Measured performance equals actual performance plus noise. We compare a stable environment where the noise is small with a volatile environment where the noise is large. Subjects exert significantly more effort in the volatile environment than in the stable environment. This finding is in line with standard agency theory and contrasts a distinct element of expectancy theory; noisier performance measures do not lower work motivation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 08-074/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
Performance measurement
noise
work motivation
experiments
agency theory
expectancy theory
Leistungsmotivation
Performance-Management
Test
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Erwartungstheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sloof, Randolph
van Praag, C. Mirjam
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sloof, Randolph
  • van Praag, C. Mirjam
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2008

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