Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

Arbeitspapier

We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in rationalizable strategies. We identify a new condition, which we call set-monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation. Set-monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity, which is the key condition for Nash implementation and which also had been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of social choice functions. Set-monotonicity reduces to Maskin monotonicity in the case of functions. We conclude that the conditions for rationalizable implementation are not only starkly different from, but also much weaker than those for Nash implementation, when we consider social choice correspondences.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2016-4

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: complete information ; implementation ; Maskin monotonicity ; rationalizability ; set-monotonicity ; social choice correspondence

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kunimoto, Takashi ; Serrano, Roberto
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Brown University, Department of Economics
• (where): Providence, RI
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/162754
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET