Arbeitspapier
Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness for Correspondences
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 98-2
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Nehring, Klaus
Marcellino, Massimiliano
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Davis, CA
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Nehring, Klaus
- Marcellino, Massimiliano
- University of California, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1998