Arbeitspapier
Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness for Correspondences
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 98-2
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nehring, Klaus
Marcellino, Massimiliano
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Davis, CA
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nehring, Klaus
- Marcellino, Massimiliano
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1998