Arbeitspapier

Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness for Correspondences

We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 98-2

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nehring, Klaus
Marcellino, Massimiliano
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Department of Economics
(wo)
Davis, CA
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nehring, Klaus
  • Marcellino, Massimiliano
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1998

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