Arbeitspapier

Monotonicity Implies Strategy-Proofness for Correspondences

We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 98-2

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Nehring, Klaus
Marcellino, Massimiliano
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of California, Department of Economics
(where)
Davis, CA
(when)
1998

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Nehring, Klaus
  • Marcellino, Massimiliano
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1998

Other Objects (12)