Arbeitspapier
How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption
Large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2014-02
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
- Subject
-
large-scale land acquisitions
land grabbing
foreign investments
weak institutions
property rights
corruption
large-N study
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Bujko, Matthias
Fischer, Christian
Krieger, Tim
Meierrieks, Daniel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik
- (where)
-
Freiburg
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bujko, Matthias
- Fischer, Christian
- Krieger, Tim
- Meierrieks, Daniel
- Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik
Time of origin
- 2014