Arbeitspapier

How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption

Large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2014-02

Classification
Wirtschaft
International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements
Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
Subject
large-scale land acquisitions
land grabbing
foreign investments
weak institutions
property rights
corruption
large-N study

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bujko, Matthias
Fischer, Christian
Krieger, Tim
Meierrieks, Daniel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik
(where)
Freiburg
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bujko, Matthias
  • Fischer, Christian
  • Krieger, Tim
  • Meierrieks, Daniel
  • Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik

Time of origin

  • 2014

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