How institutions shape land deals: The role of corruption

Arbeitspapier

Large-scale land acquisitions, or land grabs, concentrate in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendly setting caused by a weak institutional framework. We argue that corrupt elites exploit this given institutional set-up to strike deals with international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 157 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that these land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2014-02

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products ; Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment ; Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts
• Subject: large-scale land acquisitions ; land grabbing ; foreign investments ; weak institutions ; property rights ; corruption ; large-N study

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bujko, Matthias ; Fischer, Christian ; Krieger, Tim ; Meierrieks, Daniel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessur für Ordnungs- und Wettbewerbspolitik
• (where): Freiburg
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/98848
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET