How Institutions Shape Land Deals: The Role of Corruption

Arbeitspapier

Large-scale land acquisitions often take place in developing countries which are also known for their corruption-friendliness caused by weak institutional frameworks. We hypothesize that corruption indeed leads to more land deals. We argue that corrupt elites exploit poor institutional setups (characterized by corruption) to strike deals with domestic and international investors at the expense of the local population. Using panel data for 156 countries from 2000-2011, we provide evidence that large-scale land deals indeed occur more often in countries with higher levels of corruption. The estimated effects are also economically substantive and particularly relevant to economies with unsound institutions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5178

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products ; Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
• Thema: large-scale land acquisitions ; land grabbing ; foreign investments ; weak institutions ; corruption

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bujko, Matthias ; Fischer, Christian ; Krieger, Tim ; Meierrieks, Daniel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2015

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107331
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ