Arbeitspapier

Trading for the future: signaling in permit markets

Tradable permits are celebrated as a political instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal abatement costs through trade and (ii) the government to distribute the burden of the policy in a politically fair and feasible way. These two concerns, however, conflict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating that high-cost firms will receive more permits in the future, firms purchase excessive amounts of permits to signal high costs. This raises the price above marginal costs and distorts abatements. In fact, it is better with non-tradable permits if the heterogeneity between the firms is small, if the (shadow) price for permits is large, and if the government redistributes permits frequently.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1429

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Tradable permits
private information
signaling

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Harstad, Bård
Eskeland, Gunnar S.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
(wo)
Evanston, IL
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Harstad, Bård
  • Eskeland, Gunnar S.
  • Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Entstanden

  • 2006

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