International Emission Permit Markets with Refunding

Arbeitspapier

We propose a blueprint for an international emission permit market such as the EU trading scheme. Each country decides on the amount of permits it wants to offer. A fraction of these permits is grandfathered, the remainder is auctioned. Revenues from the auction are collected in a global fund and reimbursed to member countries in fixed proportions. We show that international permit markets with refunding lead to outcomes in which all countries tighten the issuance of permits and are better off compared to standard international permit markets. If the share of grandfathered permits is sufficiently small, we obtain approximately socially optimal emission reductions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 08/97

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming ; Public Goods
• Thema: climate change mitigation ; global refunding scheme ; international permit markets ; international agreements ; tradeable permits ; Klimawandel ; Emissionshandel ; Emissionshandel ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gersbach, Hans ; Winkler, Ralph
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
• (wo): Zurich
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.3929/ethz-a-005678166
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/171540
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ