Arbeitspapier
How to Pollute a River If You Must
We propose the river pollution claims problem to distribute a pollution budget among agents located along a river. A key distinction with the standard claims problem is that agents are ordered exogenously. For environmental reasons, the location of pollution along the river is an important concern in addition to fairness. We characterize the class of externality-adjusted proportional rules and argue that they strike a balance between fairness and minimizing environmental damage in the river. We also propose two novel axioms that are motivated by the river pollution context and use them to characterize two priority rules.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2023-036/VIII
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Externalities
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Cooperative Games
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
- Thema
-
Claims Problem
River Pollution
Pollution Permits
Externality-Adjusted Proportional Rules
Priority Rules
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Yang, Yuzhi
Ansink, Erik
Gudmundsson, Jens
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2023
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Yang, Yuzhi
- Ansink, Erik
- Gudmundsson, Jens
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2023
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