Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley

Arbeitspapier

Adam Smith alleged that secret employer collusion to reduce labor earnings is common. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: no-poach agreements through which technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. Estimates indicate each agreement cost affected workers approximately 2.5 percent of annual salary. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14843

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets ; Antitrust Law ; Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
• Subject: monopsony ; oligopsony ; employer market power ; labor earnings

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gibson, Matthew
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/250504
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET