Arbeitspapier

Education policy and intergenerational transfers in equilibrium

This paper examines the equilibrium effects of alternative financial aid policies intended to promote college participation. We build an overlapping generations life-cycle, heterogeneous-agent, incomplete-markets model with education, labor supply, and consumption/saving decisions. Driven by both altruism and paternalism, parents make inter vivos transfers to their children. Both cognitive and non-cognitive skills determine the non-pecuniary cost of schooling. Labor supply during college, government grants and loans, as well as private loans, complement parental resources as means of funding college education. We find that the current financial aid system in the U.S. improves welfare, and removing it would reduce GDP by 4-5 percentage points in the long-run. Further expansions of government-sponsored loan limits or grants would have no salient aggregate effects because of substantial crowding-out: every additional dollar of government grants crowds out 30 cents of parental transfers plus an equivalent amount through a reduction in student's labor supply. However, a small group of high-ability children from poor families, especially girls, would greatly benefit from more generous federal aid.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. W16/04

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Labor Demand
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Thema
Education
Financial Aid
Intergenerational Transfers
Altruism
Paternalism
Credit Constraints
Equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Abbott, Brant
Gallipoli, Giovanni
Meghir, Costas
Violante, Giovanni L.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
(wo)
London
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.1920/WP.IFS.2016.1604
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Abbott, Brant
  • Gallipoli, Giovanni
  • Meghir, Costas
  • Violante, Giovanni L.
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Entstanden

  • 2016

Ähnliche Objekte (12)