Arbeitspapier

Education policy and intergenerational transfers in equilibrium

This paper examines the equilibrium effects of alternative financial aid policies intended to promote college participation. We build an overlapping generations life cycle model with education, labor supply, and consumption/saving decisions. Cognitive and non-cognitive skills of children depend on the cognitive skills and education of parents, and affect education choice and labor market outcomes. Driven by both altruism and paternalism, parents make transfers to their children which can be used to fund education, supplementing grants, loans and the labor supply of the children themselves during college. The crowding out of parental transfers by government programs is sizable and thus cannot be ignored when designing policy. The current system of federal aid is valuable: removing either grants or loans would each reduce output by 2% and welfare by 3% in the long-run. An expansion of aid towards ability-tested grants would be markedly superior to either an expansion of student loans or a labor tax cut. This result is, in part, due to the complementarity between parental education and ability in the production of skills of future generations.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IFS Working Papers ; No. W18/16

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Labor Demand
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Thema
Ability Transmission
Altruism
Credit Constraints
Education
Equilibrium
Financial Aid
Intergenerational Transfers
Paternalism
Studienfinanzierung
Intergenerationale Übertragung
Bildungspolitik
Overlapping Generations
Agentenbasierte Modellierung
Theorie
USA

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Abbott, Brant
Gallipoli, Giovanni
Meghir, Costas
Violante, Giovanni L.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)
(wo)
London
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Abbott, Brant
  • Gallipoli, Giovanni
  • Meghir, Costas
  • Violante, Giovanni L.
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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